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FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

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March 15, 1940

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The Near East and the European War

BY PHILIP W. IRELAND

PUBLISHED TWICE A MONTH BY THE

Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated

EIGHT WEST FORTIETH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

VOLUME XVI NUMBER 1 25¢ a copy \$5.00 a year

The Near East and the European War

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

AT THE outbreak of war in 1914 the Ottoman Empire, momentarily enjoying a new but illusory lease of life under the young Turks, stretched across the end of the Eastern Mediterranean from the River Maritza to the Indian Ocean and from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Egypt still paid lip service to the Sultan as Suzerain. Cyprus maintained the fiction of its connection with the Empire. The Arab principalities of the Persian Gulf and the Arab Peninsula acknowledged Turkish authority in proportion to the strength of the Turkish garrisons placed over them.¹

The European powers, enjoying special privileges under the system of Capitulations, had created spheres of influence within the Empire and were frankly anxious to convert these spheres into outright possessions.² Throughout the Empire ambitious leaders and minority groups, stirred by incipient nationalism, looked to the great powers for aid in creating national states.

When the Ottoman Empire, ill-equipped and poorly organized,³ entered the war on the side of Germany in October 1914, it found itself engaged on five fronts: in Mesopotamia against Britain, on the Dardanelles against the British and French, in the Caucasus against Russia, in Palestine against the British, and eventually in the Hijaz against the Arabs.⁴ The end of the war—and of the Empire—came with the Armistice of Mudros,

October 30, 1918. The Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923⁵—the only negotiated peace treaty of the war—formalized the collapse of the Empire, although Britain and France, ostensibly in accordance with the League Covenant but in reality in conformity with their war and post-war agreements,⁶ had already parcelled among themselves the non-Turkish portions of the Empire and had set up their own administrations in five sections of its former territory: Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and the Lebanon.⁷ The Arabs have charged that these new governments—notably that of Palestine, which attempted to implement the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917⁸—conflicted with promises and declarations made to them by Britain and France during and after the war to insure their support of the Allied cause.⁹ These charges, as well as Zionist countercharges that Britain has failed in its duty to facilitate the National Home in Palestine, and denials by the French and British of these various accusations have served to embitter relations between the Western powers, the Arab Nationalists, the Zionist organizations, and their various sympathizers.

1. M. F. Jacob, *Kings of Arabia* (London, Mills and Boon, 1932); G. Bell, *Review of Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, Cmd. 1061 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1920).

2. For the aspirations of the great powers before 1914, cf. H. N. Howard, *Partition of Turkey* (Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), *passim*.

3. Cf. Ahmet Emin, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), especially chs. VI-XXIV.

4. For conduct of the war against the Ottoman Empire, cf. F. J. Moberly, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918* (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1923-24); C. Falls and G. MacMunn, *Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine* (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1928-30); M. Larcher, *La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale* (Paris, E. Chiron, 1926); T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1936), etc.

5. For text, cf. *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-23, Turkey No. 1* (1923), Cmd. 1814 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1924).

6. Especially the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916; the San Remo Agreement, April 24-25, 1920; and the Convention between Great Britain and France, December 23, 1920.

7. *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, Frowde, Hodder and Stoughton, 1920-24), Vol. VI; *Survey of International Affairs, 1925* (London, Oxford University Press, 1927), Vol. I, pp. 346 *et seq.*; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1939), chs. XIV-XVI; Philip W. Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* (New York, Macmillan, 1938), *passim*.

8. For facsimile of Declaration, cf. L. Stein, *Zionism* (London, Benn, 1925).

9. Notably the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif Husain; the Cairo Declaration of June 16, 1918; and the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918. Texts in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, cited; also published officially in various British command papers.

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, VOLUME XVI, NUMBER I, MARCH 15, 1940

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, 8 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y., U.S.A. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; WILLIAM T. STONE, *Vice President* and Washington representative; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor and Research Director*; HELEN TERRY, *Assistant Editor*. Research Associates: T. A. BISSEY, A. RANDLE ELLIOTT, JAMES FREDERICK GREEN, FREDERICK T. MERRILL, HELEN H. MOORHEAD, DAVID H. POPPER, ONA K. D. RINGWOOD, HOWARD J. TRUEBLOOD, JOHN C. DEWILDE. Subscription Rates: \$5.00 a year; to F.P.A. members \$3.00; single copies 25 cents. Entered as second-class matter on March 31, 1931 at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

POST-WAR SETTLEMENT

The present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is the direct result of contradictory political forces released by the war of 1914-1918: the imperialistic ambitions of the great powers, which sought to partition the Ottoman Empire; the development of Turkish and Arab aspirations for independence; and the desire of Zionists for a National Home in Palestine. To these must be added forces emanating from the West: secularism, industrialism, and a desire for modernization, under the impact of which the East has seemingly achieved a new vitality, expressed not merely by a cultural and social renaissance employing Western methods and techniques but also by the growth of opposition to Western imperialism.¹⁰

As a result of the peace treaties of 1919-1921, nine new states replace today the former Ottoman Empire.¹¹

Turkey. Turkey, now one-third of its size in 1914, has been transformed into a republic, unified and revitalized by Kemal Atatürk and his Turkish nationalists who accomplished the apparently impossible feat of overcoming internal obstacles and preventing the Allies from parceling Turkey proper.

Sa'udi Arabia and the Yaman. In the Arab peninsula the force and character of Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, head of the Wahhabis, at one time in alliance with Britain, have molded widely varied parts of Arabia, including the domain of Husain, Sharif of Mecca and Medina, into the new state of Sa'udi Arabia.¹² Imam Yahya of Yaman shares with him hegemony of the Peninsula, with the exception of the British-controlled areas adjacent to Oman, Aden and the Hadramaut.

Iraq. Iraq, occupying the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates and the desert to the west, is the only Class A mandate to achieve independence according to Allied wartime promises and the aim of the mandate system as originally envisaged in the League Covenant. It attained statehood on admission to the League of Nations on October 3, 1932, after long and bitter agitation on the part of Iraqi nationalists, many of whom continue to urge complete elimination of the influence retained by Britain in its Treaty of Alliance of June 30, 1930.¹³ Iraq is free to administer its internal affairs

through its own government, now under the Regency of Amir Abdul Ilha, uncle of the four-year-old King, Faisal II, grandson of Faisal I.

Egypt. In Egypt, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935-1936 terminated the struggle between Egyptian nationalists and Britain, which feared to lose control of the Suez Canal and of the air route to the further East. Egypt attained independence under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, 1936,¹⁴ and was admitted to the League of Nations on May 26, 1937.¹⁵ Although the 1936 treaty reduced British personnel outside the Canal zone to a minimum, and British influence in Egyptian affairs has perceptibly declined, a considerable element, including the *Wafd* and the Young Egyptians, continue to demand complete elimination of British control.¹⁶

Transjordan. Transjordan, the important buffer state between Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and Sa'udi Arabia with possession of Aqaba, never recognized by Ibn Sa'ud, is nominally ruled by Amir Abdulla, third son of Sharif Husain. British Residents, assisted by British officers, have long exercised authority in Transjordan. It is not unlikely that, without British protection and subsidies, Transjordan would be overrun by tribesmen or absorbed by Ibn Sa'ud.¹⁷

Palestine. In Palestine the clash between imperialism and Arab and Jewish nationalism has brought increasing conflict since 1919, with no less than five uprisings and much bloodshed. Of all of the mandated ex-Ottoman territories, Palestine has made the least progress toward termination of the mandate, both because of Britain's determination to protect its imperial interests in that region, and the failure of its attempt to fulfill the principal obligations imposed by the mandate.¹⁸ As a result, control is exercised directly by a British High Commissioner responsible to the Colonial Secretary in London.

Syria and the Lebanon. Syria and the Lebanon are nominally two republics with indigenous governments, set up in 1926 and 1928 respectively.¹⁹ In fact, they are under French mandate, final authority being exercised by a French High Commissioner. Nationalists, particularly in Syria, have long demanded full independence and affiliation with an Arab confederation.

waterways in wartime, and the right in peace time to maintain in Iraq a military mission and air bases, now confined to Dhibban, 50 miles west of Baghdad, and to Shaiba near Basra.

14. For negotiations, cf. *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, cited, pp. 662-701; for text, cf. *Treaty Series, No. 6* (1937) (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1937).

15. *The Times* (London), May 27, 1937.

16. Cf. *Oriente Moderno*, Anno XVII, *passim*.

17. Cf. *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, cited, pp. 324-46; *ibid.*, 1934, pp. 306-08.

18. Cf. White Paper on Palestine, May 17, 1939; *The New York Times*, May 18, 1939; *Palestine: A Statement of Policy*, Cmd. 6019 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939). For text of mandate, cf. *Final Draft of the Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine*, Cmd. 1500 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1921).

19. Cf. *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, cited, p. 443; *ibid.*, 1928, pp. 307 *et seq.*

10. Cf. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London, Routledge and Sons, 1932).

11. These states, covering about 900,000 square miles and inhabited by 45,000,000 persons, together with Iran and occasional references to the Balkan states with which Turkey has international commitments, comprise the territorial scope of this report.

12. For his rise to power, cf. H. St. J. B. Philby, *The Heart of Arabia* (London, Constable, 1922); *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (London, Constable, 1928).

13. For text, cf. *Treaty Series, No. 15* (1931), Cmd. 3797 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1931). This treaty gives Britain the right to use Iraq's communications, airports and

tion. They openly rebelled in 1925-1926,²⁰ and have remained in a state of semi-rebellion until recently. Many Lebanese, however—particularly Christians—while demanding independence, have dissociated themselves from Pan-Arabism. The French, for their part, have urged the necessity of protecting the minorities, and with their own interests in mind resisted nationalist demands until 1936, when the Blum government signed treaties with Syria on September 9, 1936 and the Lebanon on November 13, 1936.²¹ These treaties, many sections of which were modeled on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930—although less favorable to Syria and the Lebanon—were to come into force three years after ratification by the French Parliament, which has not yet taken place.

MILITARY POTENTIALS

Control of the Eastern Mediterranean, today no less than in the past, continues to be sought because of the strategical value of this area, its military potentials, and the highly important but intangible factor of great power prestige.

THE STRAITS

The Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, collectively known as the Straits, connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, are possessed in full sovereignty by Turkey under the terms of the Montreux Convention.²² Their heavy fortifications make them almost impregnable under existing conditions. Standing astride the continents of Europe and Asia, Turkey can open or close them at its discretion in times of war or threatened war.²³

The Straits lie across Germany's *Drang nach Osten* to Baghdad and beyond. They outflank any port, such as Alexandropolis (Dedeagach), which Germany might acquire on the Aegean. They are Russia's back door to warm water, coveted by the Tsars. Their control by a power in alliance with Britain opens the Black Sea to Allied fleets and prepares the way for effective aid to Rumania or for pressure on Rumania and Russia. Allied naval operations in this area would extend their economic blockade of Germany to the Balkans and to the Black Sea. Should Turkey be attacked by Russia at

either end of the Black Sea,²⁴ protection could then be provided for an Allied thrust directed at Baku and the Baku-Kiev railway.²⁵

THE SUEZ CANAL

In the southeastern corner of the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal remains the "main arterial road"²⁶ to three Empires—British, French, and Italian—which together owned 70 per cent of the total tonnage using the Canal in 1938.²⁷ Closing of the Canal in war or peace would most vitally affect Italy, which lacks essential raw materials and is particularly vulnerable to blockade, especially if the Straits of Gibraltar are simultaneously closed.²⁸ The greater part of Italy's new colonial Empire lies south of the Canal, and severance of rapid communications with it might prove disastrous. By contrast, Britain and France could route their ships around the Cape at additional cost and delay, varying from 10 per cent in the case of Australia to 80 per cent in the case of India.²⁹

Yet Britain's determined efforts to maintain predominant influence in Egypt indicate the importance it attributes to the Canal. The long delay in negotiations over Egyptian independence were due to Britain's demand for adequate protection of the Canal and for special privileges in Egypt in time of war, now assured in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.³⁰ Britain's interest in this region resulted in the establishment of its mandate over Palestine as additional protection for the Canal, and the inclusion within Transjordan of the port of Aqaba, highly important as part of the alternative land and water route to the Suez Canal.³¹

24. The passage of British or French ships, however, seems to rest on political considerations. In particular, the Turks will have to decide whether to invoke the Second Protocol of the Tri-Partite Agreement of October 19, 1939, or Articles 19, 20, 21 of the Montreux Convention, or Article 16 of the League Covenant.

25. German military engineers are said to be fortifying this line as well as the Odessa-Lwow Line. Cf. *The New York Times*, February 12, 13, 14, 18, 1940.

26. Anthony Eden, November 5, 1936, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, Vol. 317, col. 283.

27. A total of 34,418,187 tons passed through the Canal in 1938. Of this total, British ships formed 50.4 per cent; Italy, 13.5 per cent; Germany, 9.2 per cent; Netherlands, 8.8 per cent; France, 5.1 per cent. United States ships were tenth on the list, with 1.1 per cent. C. Empson, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt*, Department of Overseas Trade No. 735 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939), p. 63.

28. Cf. E. Monroe, *The Mediterranean in Politics* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939: 2nd ed.), Table II.

29. *Round Table*, September 1936.

30. *Treaty Series*, No. 6 (1937), cited, Articles 7, 8 (with Annex), 9. For development of land and sea routes in the Near and Middle East, cf. H. L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1928).

31. *Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 153.

20. Cf. E. P. MacCallum, *Nationalist Crusade in Syria* (New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1928).

21. For negotiation and comparison with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, cf. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1936, cited, pp. 748 et seq.

22. For text, cf. *Documents on International Affairs*, 1936 (London, Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 648-67. For negotiations, cf. official proceedings in *Actes de la Conférence de Montreux* (Paris, Pedone, 1936); cf. also *Survey of International Affairs*, 1936, cited, pp. 584-645.

23. Cf. Articles 20 and 21 of the Montreux Convention.

In the present conflict Britain has stationed most of the Mediterranean fleet in Egyptian waters, strengthened the Royal Air Force in that region, and concentrated for service in Egypt and elsewhere British troops variously estimated at 65,000 to 300,000 men, including Australian and New Zealand contingents.³²

AIR AND LAND COMMUNICATIONS

The development of air and motor transport, the building of roads, and the extension of rail-road systems since 1918 have given greatly increased importance to communications and movement of men and supplies over the land-bridge between the shores of the Mediterranean and the further East, and between north and south in the Near and Middle East.

Instead of the tracks and desert waste over which drivers forced their motors in the last war, a far-reaching web of roads, hard-surfaced or asphalted on the important sections, is now available. Roads of military importance include the 600-mile trans-desert route from Haifa and Damascus by way of Rutba Wells to Baghdad, now being asphalted.³³ Other roads of importance are the Ruwanduz Gorge road through the Kurdistan mountains from Iraq to Tabriz in Iran,³⁴ the motor road from Trabzon on the Black Sea to Tabriz over which the Turkish government has maintained a regular bus service, and a mountain road from Hopa to Borchka with connections to Kars, Artvin and Ardahan. The road from Baghdad to the Caucasian-Caspian area by way of Hamadan and Kazvin was one used by Dunsterville on his expedition to Baku during the last war.³⁵ A new road, surfaced by a special "mix-in-place" process, has recently been constructed from Suez through Sinai into Palestine. Strategic roads are being pushed to completion from Alexandria toward the Libyan frontier.³⁶



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THE NEAR EAST

Excellent roads exist throughout Palestine, Lebanon and Syria up to the Turkish border.³⁷

Waterways, notably the Shatt al-Arab, and the Tigris, northward from the port of Basra, could doubtless play a vital part in the movement of troops and supplies, as in the last war.³⁸

Strategic, not economic, motives seem to have dictated most railway construction in the Near East since 1918. The line from Kantara on the Suez Canal to Haifa has long been in use. Construction on the former Berlin-Basra railway in Syria, Turkey and Iraq leaves the Mosul-Baiji section, now being completed, as the only break in service from London to Basra. The extension of the Turkish system to Erzerum makes possible rail transport through existing connections to the Russian border. The recent earthquakes have not affected the roadbed and tunnels.³⁹ New lines are also being pushed by the Turks toward Iran and Iraq. The new trans-Iranian railroad, built at enormous expense and sacrifice, has now linked north and south Iran. Whether it has made Iran less dependent on the Soviet Union, as intended, is not yet clear.⁴⁰ In Egypt the strategic railway has been extended toward the Libyan border.

32. Cf. *The New York Times*, February 13, 25, 1940.

33. This road, whose cost, estimated at \$3,000,000, will be met by grants from the British government, is to take the place of the once-projected railway from the Mediterranean. Cf. *Great Britain and the East*, June 1, 1939, pp. 607, 612.

34. For an account of the building of this road, cf. A. M. Hamilton, *Road Through Kurdistan* (London, Faber and Faber, 1937).

35. Cf. L. C. Dunsterville, *The Adventures of Dunsterville* (London, Edward Arnold, 1920).

36. Cf. Empson, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt*, cited, p. 65.

37. Turkey, although claiming 23,000 miles of roads for wheeled vehicles and planning for 10,000 miles more, has not yet brought its road system up to the standards of its railway system.

38. Article 4 of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Cf. *Treaty Series*, No. 15 (1931), cited.

39. It is now possible to travel from the Canal to Istanbul or Erzerum with only two changes, due to variations in gauges, at Haifa and at Rayak in Syria.

40. Cf. Henry Filmer, *The Pageant of Persia* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1936), *passim*; A. G. Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, April 1938.

Initial possession of these communications by Britain, France and their allies—Turkey, Iraq and Egypt—give them a mobility unknown in 1914-1918. Providing that local deficiencies in rolling stock and motor equipment can be overcome, troops concentrated in Syria, Palestine and Egypt can now be promptly transferred to the most effective point, whether in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, or in local defense.

NAVAL BASES

The control of naval and air bases in the Eastern Mediterranean, no less than that of railways, waterways, road and air routes, has been stressed by the great powers. Britain and France, through their mandates and alliances, have acquired the majority of these bases. From Alexandria, whose dry dock and repair shops are being extended,⁴¹ from Port Said, and from Haifa with its fuel supplies, the British Mediterranean fleet may not only defend the Canal but also take naval initiative. None of these ports provide a base comparable to Malta, which is no longer invulnerable due to the expansion of Italy's air and sea power. Haifa, the third largest harbor in the Eastern Mediterranean, cannot be fortified under the terms of the Palestine mandate. The potentialities of Cyprus as a naval and air base, although considered by the British Imperial Staff, have never been developed.⁴² The Cyprus harbor of Famagusta is only available for craft under 7,000 tons. Accommodation for warships is also limited at Beirut, but protection is offered by fortifications installed in the Lebanon. Fuel oil is obtainable at Tripoli.

Under the provisions of the Tri-Partite Agreement,⁴³ excellent bases are now available to France and Britain in the fortified Gulf of Izmir where the Allies are said to be cooperating in establishing a base at Cheshme,⁴⁴ at Turkey's principal base of

Izmit, in the Bosphorus, and at ports on the Black Sea. The natural harbor of Alexandretta, where the Turks, with British credits, are reported to be planning a new naval base,⁴⁵ would provide anchorage although the new fortifications are not yet complete. These bases might be supplemented by Greek ports.^{45a}

At the southern end of the Red Sea lie the island of Perim, a cable station, and Aden, the only fortified British port between Malta and Bombay, which has important fuel oil and bunkering facilities. Italy has attempted for a number of years to neutralize Aden by obtaining a special position in Yaman⁴⁶ and acquiring strategic points at Dumeira, Assab, Massawa, and Mogadisco.⁴⁷ It is doubtful, however, whether any of these bases, or Asmara in Eritrea, could maintain themselves, if severed from Italy, against attack from Aden and India.

AIR BASES

With the development of air warfare, air bases have acquired paramount importance. Since the Cairo Conference, called by Mr. Winston Churchill in 1921, the protection of British interests has been entrusted to the Middle East Command of the Royal Air Force, with headquarters at Cairo. Air bases have been established at all strategic points, one or more squadrons being stationed at Aden, Cairo, Aboukir, Ismailia in Egypt, Ramla in Palestine, Amman and Aqaba in Transjordan, Dhibban and Shaiba (Basra) in Iraq. The Royal Egyptian Air Force, under British supervision, is established at Mersa Matruh, Dekheila and other points. France has long maintained a military air base at Rayak in Syria. A seaplane base at Tripoli has been built by *Air France*, which can be utilized by the French government.⁴⁸

It would appear that with these bases the Allies possess mastery of the air in the Asiatic section of the southeastern Mediterranean. In Egypt their

41. Cf. *Oriente Moderno*, January 1940.

42. Cf. *Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom*, cited, pp. 114-16. The Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1937 is given as a reason for the non-development of Cyprus as a base.

43. The British-French-Turkish Mutual Assistance Agreement, known as the Tri-Partite Agreement, signed at Ankara on October 19, 1939, provided for: 1. Aid by Britain and France to Turkey if the latter is attacked by any European power. 2. Mutual assistance between Britain, France and Turkey if aggression by any European power leads to war in the Mediterranean. 3. Turkish cooperation with Britain and France if the Western powers attempt to implement their guarantees of April 13, 1939 to Rumania and Greece. By the terms of Protocol II, however, the obligations undertaken by Turkey in the Agreement could not "compel that country to take action having as its effect or involving as a consequence entry in armed conflict with the U.S.S.R." For text, cf. *The New York Times*, October 20, 1939. Cf. also J. C. deWilde, "The Struggle for the Balkans," *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 15, 1939.

44. *The New York Times*, July 18, 1939.

45. Cf. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 28, 1939.

45a. Cf. J. C. deWilde, D. H. Popper and Eunice Clark, *Handbook of the War* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1939), p. 133.

46. For an account of an Italian landing party at Hodeida in Yaman, cf. *Royal Central Asian Journal*, January 1937, pp. 125-27.

47. Cf. deWilde, Popper and Clark, *Handbook of the War*, cited.

48. Cf. *Air Force List*, August 1939 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939). Auxiliary services and landing fields are also available at Abu Sueir, Alexandria, Heliopolis and Sollum in Egypt; at Gaza, Ludd, Haifa and Sarafand in Palestine; Rutba and Mosul in Iraq; Beirut, Damascus and Palmyra in French Levant; Ma'an and Ziza in Transjordan; and Nicosia in Cyprus.

control could be disputed by Italy from the naval and air base at Tobruk in Libya, 360 miles from Alexandria and 400 miles from Cairo. In the north Italy, operating from its powerful base at Portogalo in Leros in the Dodecanese appears at present to have a distinct advantage. Leros is only 190 miles from Athens, 290 from Istanbul, 350 from Ankara and 400 from Alexandria—comparatively short distances in modern warfare.⁴⁹ Should Italy engage in war against the Allies, it would probably attempt to strike from the air. Yet so exposed are these Italian bases to naval and air attacks from land or from aircraft carriers that, unless Italy delivered immediate knock-out blows or obtained naval control of the Mediterranean, they would soon be captured or destroyed. This would be particularly true if the Allies had Turkish support. Turkey would welcome the opportunity of ousting the Italians from the Dodecanese, obtained by Italy from Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

NEAR EAST MILITARY AID TO ALLIES

Under the terms of the Tri-Partite Agreement, the Allies in certain conditions can count on military assistance from the Turks in addition to their own forces now in or on their way to the Near East. The peace-time strength of the Turkish army, estimated at 180,000 men, can be increased to 750,000, possibly more, but full equipment for these is not yet available. Arms have been purchased from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland and Britain, and have also been manufactured at home. The Turkish air service has about 175 bombers, 300 fighters, and 100 reconnaissance planes comprising the first-line forces.⁵⁰ The second-line forces total 350 to 400 ships of all classes. The personnel is said to include some 700 well-trained pilots and 7,500 to 8,000 other ranks. The Turkish navy, although not large, includes the rebuilt 22,500 ton *Yavuz*, formerly the *Goeben*, which is probably more than a match for any naval unit now in the Black Sea.

Iraq and Egypt are not specifically obliged by the terms of their treaties to furnish troops for the aid of Britain,⁵¹ although the British assume that obligation toward them. The forces of

both countries, however, are likely to be placed at the service of His Majesty's Government. Their resources and relatively recent military development tend to make their military contributions negligible except for purposes of defense. Both the Iraqi and the Egyptian armies have had the advice of British military missions and have been armed with British equipment. Iraq's standing army numbers about 20,000 to 28,000 men, with an estimated war strength of 40,000. Egypt is still in the process of creating an army of 30,000 men. Iraq's small air force comprises from 40 to 50 planes; that of Egypt 30, all of British manufacture.⁵²

ECONOMIC POTENTIALS

Important as are the military potentials of the Near East, the economic resources of this area are no less vital in the economic warfare now being waged between Germany and the Allies. The economic picture of the Near East has changed considerably since 1914-1918. Most of the population, like their ancestors, till the soil and tend their flocks. Industrialization and exploitation of minerals under state and private initiative, however, now make possible the local production of many articles formerly imported from abroad.

Turkey's government plans (including the 1934 Five-Year Plan for seventeen factories, the Three-Year Development Program, the erection of the only steel plant in the Near East at Karabük, the establishment of small-arms, munition and airplane factories at Ankara, Eskişehir and Kaysari, the 1938 Four-Year Plan for eighteen undertakings⁵³), and less ambitious schemes in Egypt, Iran and Iraq,⁵⁴ all inspired by nationalism, have as their object the production—as far as possible from local raw materials—not only of armaments but also textiles, sugar, chemicals, cellulose, cement and other articles serving both peace and wartime needs. The production of state-controlled and private industries, particularly in Turkey and Palestine, is considerable, but only in limited cases has it been able to meet local needs either in the quantity or variety required. In still fewer cases

49. Cf. R. Ernest Dupuy, *World in Arms* (Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Co., 1939).

50. Exports of American airplanes and parts to Turkey were valued at \$3,160,336 in 1938 and at \$1,176,732 in 1939. Cf. *The New York Herald Tribune*, February 25, 1940.

51. Article 7 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 reads in part as follows: "The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt . . . will consist in furnishing . . . all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes, and means of communication."

52. Cf. Dupuy, *World in Arms*, cited; Hanson Baldwin, *The New York Times*, February 25, 1940; *Bulletin of International News*, February 10, 1940.

53. *Ulus*, September 21, 22, 24, 1938; S. R. Jordan, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Turkey*, Department of Overseas Trade No. 729 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939), pp. 17 *et seq.*

54. J. P. Summerscale, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Iraq 1935-37*, Department of Overseas Trade No. 699 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1938), p. 19; Empson, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt*, cited, p. 52; "L'Industrializzazione della Persia," *Oriente Moderno*, February 1938, pp. 102-08.

are manufactured articles of the Near East available for sale to belligerents or neutrals.

The principal economic contribution that Eastern Mediterranean countries may be expected to make in this war will be as producers of cotton, wool, fruits, tobacco, livestock and raw materials, including chrome, copper, lead, zinc and coal from Turkey, manganese and cobalt from Egypt, potash from Palestine, and oil from Iraq, Iran and Sa'udi Arabia.

Peace-time purchases of these commodities by Britain and France, with the exception of oil and cotton, have never been large. Turkey, the world's third largest producer of chrome, was Britain's chief foreign source of supply in 1938, yet it furnished only 3,441 tons out of the total of 37,638 tons imported by Britain.⁵⁵

Cyprus has supplied but a small fraction of its annual copper ore production of about 150,000 tons⁵⁶ to Britain, although it could provide a large proportion of British requirements.⁵⁷ Palestine has already become the key source of potash for Britain and many neutrals, production having been increased since September 1939 by 35 per cent over the corresponding months of the preceding year.⁵⁸

Egypt furnishes nearly 15 per cent of Britain's peace-time requirements of raw cotton. The present problem is not the lack of supply, for the 1939 crop was bountiful, but rather the maintenance of Egyptian economy based on the cotton market, which, although disturbed by war conditions, has been stabilized by Britain's offer after the outbreak of war to purchase 155,000,000 pounds of Egyptian cotton.⁵⁹

NEAR EASTERN OIL

Britain and France are more dependent on the Near East for petroleum than for any other product. Nearly one-quarter, or 24.6 per cent, of Britain's imports of oil came from Iraq and Iran in 1938.⁶⁰ Of this amount the British government-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's fields in southeast Iran supplied 20.2 per cent in 1938 as against 19.4 per cent in 1937. Too much importance

seems to have been attached to British dependence on Iraq oil coming through the trans-desert pipe lines to Haifa and to Tripoli. Such supplies formed but 3.8 per cent of British imports in 1937 and 4.4 per cent in 1938, although the quantities imported by Britain represented from 12 to 13 per cent of the 31,000,000 barrels of oil arriving at Mediterranean ports in each of those years.

France, to a greater degree than Britain, draws on Iraq and Iran for its oil requirements, obtaining 41 per cent there in 1938 (39.5 per cent from Iraq and 1.4 per cent from Iran). It was also the principal market for Iraq oil, taking 77.8 per cent in 1937 and 74.4 per cent in 1938, distributed in almost equal amounts between Haifa and Tripoli.

The oil supplies of Iraq and Iran will undoubtedly assume increasing importance during the war unless the Mediterranean is closed, particularly since the refinery at Haifa, capable of refining about half of the 15 to 16 million barrels arriving there annually, has begun production.⁶¹ The Syrian and southern Iraq fields are as yet unexploited, while oil from Bahrain and Sa'udi Arabia has not as a rule been shipped west of Suez.

Purchases of oil and other commodities from the Near East, which represent about 11 per cent of Britain's annual imports, may be expected to be heavier in wartime, particularly if shipping risks in the Mediterranean remain below those in the Atlantic. Moreover, Anglo-French purchases serve to bolster up the economy of this region and to keep Near Eastern countries in the Allied bloc. Most important of all, the Allies, through their domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, may succeed in cutting off vital supplies to the Reich. Imports from the Near East countries represented but 3.8 per cent of Germany's total imports in 1938.⁶² In a number of cases, however, the proportion of the commodities imported from these countries in relation to total German imports of these commodities is significant, and their loss will undoubtedly be felt by the Reich.

GERMAN PURCHASES IN NEAR EAST

Thus Turkey, by exporting one-third of its chrome ore in 1937 to Germany, which is entirely dependent on foreign supplies of this product, furnished the Reich with nearly 50 per cent of its chrome ore imports. The chrome ore exported to Germany in 1938, although again one-third of

55. *Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom, 1938* (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939), Vol. II.

56. *Statistical Abstract for the British Empire, 1938* (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939), Vol. II.

57. Great Britain's wartime needs have been estimated at 450,000 tons. *The Economist*, December 9, 1939.

58. *Contemporary Jewish Record*, January-February 1940.

59. *Great Britain and the East*, November 23, 1939.

60. These and following figures on petroleum production and consumption have been compiled from statistics in *Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom, 1939*, cited, Vol. II; from *International Petroleum Trade*; and from *Bulletin de la Mellié Banque Iran* (Tehran).

61. *Oriente Moderno*, January 1940.

62. *Weekly Report*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, July 27, 1939. This estimate includes Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Syria-Lebanon and Afghanistan. Germany's export trade to these countries was 5.4 per cent of its total exports.

Turkey's production, provided only about one-third of the 192,284 tons imported in that year by the Reich.⁶³ Cyprus in 1938 sent 94.6 per cent of its production of copper ore to Germany, supplying nearly 22 per cent of the Reich's copper ore imports.⁶⁴ Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Iraq furnished Germany with approximately one-fifth of its cotton needs,⁶⁵ while Turkey and Greece supplied 36 per cent of Germany's tobacco imports. Nearly all the Near Eastern countries sold quantities of food-stuffs to the Reich, including rye, barley and legumes. In fact, the bulk of Near East trade for the past few years has been with Germany rather than with Britain or France.

The extent to which closing of the Eastern Mediterranean will affect German economy is not yet clear. Large stocks of strategic materials from the Near East, as from other sources, have undoubtedly been laid in—in greater quantities, probably, than accounted for in official statistics.⁶⁶ Nor has the Eastern Mediterranean been as yet completely closed. Turkey, at the outbreak of the war, refused to renew its trade agreement with Germany, which expired on August 31,⁶⁷ and exports to the Reich showed a sharp break, but October figures for exports to Germany surpassed any pre-war month in 1939.⁶⁸ Some sentiment exists for renewal of Turco-German trade, expressed by *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul daily. The Turco-German agreement concluded late in January 1940,⁶⁹ however, was more in the nature of an arrangement to clear up German balances in Turkey than a long-term agreement; and increasing pressure will undoubtedly be brought by the Allies on the Ankara government to prevent Turkish exports from reaching the Reich.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF WAR

The economic effects of the war on the Near East resemble those in other countries producing raw materials and importing the bulk of their manufactured goods. Scarcity of transport, the al-

63. Figures based on *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1938 (Berlin, 1939); *Foreign Metals and Minerals Circular* No. 19, March 1939, p. 17. In the first four months of 1939 Germany imported 61,727 tons of chrome, of which Turkey supplied 32,495 tons, as compared with imports of 45,823 tons in the first four months of 1938.

64. *Foreign Metals and Minerals Circular* No. 20, June 25, 1939, pp. 25 *et seq.*

65. Cf. *The Economist*, December 2, 1939.

66. Thus official German figures for imports of chrome ore from Turkey in 1938 are 52,584 tons. Turkish official figures (Central Bank) are 68,463 tons.

67. *The Times*, September 4, 1939.

68. *Statistique Mensuelle du Commerce Extérieur* (Ankara), October 1939.

69. *Christian Science Monitor*, January 24, 1940.

most complete cessation of German trade, import and export restrictions, and exchange regulations have blocked imports and, in many instances, have sent prices soaring in spite of government attempts to prevent speculation. Markets have recovered somewhat from the chaotic conditions following the outbreak of war, but observers report increased living costs throughout the region.⁷⁰ The dislocation of markets has also seriously affected the Near East countries which depend on exports for consumption goods and foreign exchange. Thus far, however, the effects of sudden disruption of trade with Germany, which in peace-time might have proved disastrous, have been somewhat tempered. The diversion of British purchases of dried fruits and tobacco⁷¹ from the United States to Turkey, and French arrangements for purchases of Turkish opium and foodstuffs⁷² (much of the latter for troops concentrated in Syria), have served to steady commodity prices. The financial agreements concluded by Britain, France and Turkey on January 8 and February 3, 1940 provide not only for the continuance of these and other commodity purchases, but also for the grant of £15,000,000 to support the Turkish currency, and other sums for government subsidies in general.⁷³

Another consequence of the war has been to increase Turkey's difficulties, already acute before September 1939, in obtaining foreign exchange to pay for war materials. The recent decision of American tobacco companies to purchase their annual supplies in Turkey was consequently a great relief to the Turkish government, which finances its purchases from the United States chiefly with dollars gained through sales of tobacco to this country for blending purposes.

In Syria, French purchases for troops stationed in that area have served to stabilize local economy, while employment of unskilled labor has actually increased.⁷⁴ Palestine, where 21,231 immigrants, of whom 12,231 had immigration certificates,⁷⁵ arrived in the first ten months of 1939, has been harder hit. Unemployment among Zionist workers, officially recorded at about 13 per cent in 1937⁷⁶

70. American Commercial Attachés and Consular Officers, in *Commerce Reports*.

71. *The New York Times*, January 21, 1940. For announcement that British tobacco firms are to introduce Turkish tobacco into their blends, cf. *ibid.*, January 22, 1940.

72. *Ankara*, October 12, November 23, 1939.

73. Cf. p. 13.

74. *Great Britain and the East*, October 19, 1939.

75. *Contemporary Jewish Record*, January-February 1940, p. 65.

76. *Report by H.M. Government . . . on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan, 1937* (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1938), p. 126.

and increasing steadily in 1938,⁷⁷ had reached the figure of 30,000 to 40,000 out of a total of 100,000 to 125,000 workers.⁷⁸ Among the Arabs, unemployment was estimated to be even higher, although no official figures are available.⁷⁹

POLITICAL EFFECTS OF WAR

Among the most important political effects of the European war have been the suspension of the Arab National Movement both in its independence and its Pan-Arab aspects: the subsidence of the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine; Turkey's shift to the side of the Allies; and the eclipse of Italian, German and Soviet influence in the Near East.

ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT

The almost complete abatement of the Arab National Movement has surprised many observers in view of its pre-war strength and the apparent unity of Arabic-speaking peoples. In Syria, where the National bloc had long held power, the President of the Council and the President, Hashim al-Atasi, had resigned on July 4 and July 7, 1939, respectively, in protest against France's failure to ratify the Franco-Syrian Treaty of September 9, 1936, as well as its cession of Alexandretta to Turkey. The subsequent action of M. Puaux, the High Commissioner, in suspending the Syrian Constitution, closing Parliament, and instituting direct government⁸⁰ brought to a climax this long and turbulent period of strikes, demonstrations and agitations against France, expected by many to break out into open rebellion.⁸¹

In Palestine, on the eve of war, Arab nationalist agitation and rebellion had kept the country in a state of continuous unrest and insecurity. But repressive military action by the British, including heavy fines, destruction of villages, the capture and execution or deportation of Arab leaders, as well as the toll of physical and material exhaustion, had already affected the scope of the Arab movement in Palestine.⁸²

77. *Ibid.*, 1938, pp. 129-31.

78. *The New York Times*, November 11, 1939. Cf. also, *ibid.*, January 21, February 4, 1940.

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Oriente Moderno*, August 1939, pp. 464-67. This act created intense dissatisfaction. In Lebanon, however, the establishment of direct government on September 21 was welcomed by many because of the high cost and inefficiency of the Lebanese government it replaced. Cf. *L'Asie Française*, September-October 1939; *Oriente Moderno*, October 1939, pp. 534-35, January 1940, pp. 9-10.

81. B. C. Bergeon, "Où va la Syrie?" *Politique Étrangère*, August 1939; *Great Britain and the East*, February 9, May 25, 1939.

Further east in Iraq, Arab nationalism, actively promoted by the Ministry of Education⁸³ and encouraged by many government officials since the downfall of Bakir Sidqi, had as its objectives the removal of remaining vestiges of British influence and the attainment of independence for Palestine. Latent anti-British feeling, which exploded into mob violence—probably with outside stimulation—on the death of King Ghazi in April 1939, had led to the murder of the British Consul at Mosul.⁸⁴ An ex-Prime Minister of Iraq is said to have declared: "If Italy or Germany fights Great Britain, then we will fight on the side of Germany or Italy."

Elsewhere in the Arab, as well as the Moslem, world (although Pan-Islam as a political movement appears to be dead), concern over Arab nationalism in Palestine had been shown by the organization of Committees of Palestine Defense, the raising of funds for Palestine, participation in various conferences (as at Bludan in 1937, London in 1939, and Cairo in 1938 and 1939), and in the efforts and statements of individual leaders, notably King Ibn Sa'ud and Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq.⁸⁵

These and other factors, including the series of pacts concluded among the various Arab states, seemed to indicate that, notwithstanding the lack of a common leader and the amorphous character of the movement, new strength had been given to the Pan-Arab movement with its double objective of cultural renaissance and ultimate independence for the various Arab states within the framework of an Arab Confederation.⁸⁶

The outbreak of war, however, brought pledges of loyalty from the Arab world, including the Arab chiefs of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.⁸⁷

82. *Report by H.M. Government . . . on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan, 1937*, cited, pp. 20-21; *ibid.*, 1938 (1939), p. 24.

83. As through the organization *al-Futuwwah* (Youth Movement).

84. Cf. *The Times*, April 6, 1939.

85. Cf. R. G. Woolbert, "Pan-Arabism and the Palestine Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1938; *Bulletin of International News*, February 25, 1939; E. Rossi, "Il Congresso Interparlamentare Arabo e Musulmano pro Palestina al Cairo (7-11 Ottobre)," *Oriente Moderno*, November 1938, pp. 587-601; H. St. J. B. Philby, "Intervista con Sua Maestà il Re Ibn Sa'ud sulla questione della Palestina," *ibid.*, November 1938, pp. 582-87; *ibid.*, March 1938, p. 115; *ibid.*, Anno XVII, XVIII, XIX, *passim*; *Great Britain and the East*, November 3, 10, 17, 1938.

86. For statements of Arab aims, cf. E. P. MacCallum, "The Arab Nationalist Movement," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 8, 1935; Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, cited, *passim*.

87. For numerous statements by Syrians and Lebanese, cf. *L'Asie Française*, September-October 1939. For Arab Principalities, cf. *The Times*, September 30, November 20, 1939. For others, cf. *Palestine Post*, August 28, 1939; *Filastin*, September 5, 1939; *Le Temps*, October 2, 5, 1939; *Oriente Moderno*, October, November 1939.

Arab volunteers, reported to number 15,000 to 20,000 in Syria alone, offered their services to the Allies.⁸⁸ Statements appeared in the name of the most ardent nationalists, like the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini; Faris al-Khuri, president of the Syrian Parliament; Dr. Shahbander, Nationalist leader, and others.⁸⁹ Only the independent rulers, Ibn Sa'ud and the Imam Yahya, declared their neutrality.⁹⁰

SITUATION IN PALESTINE

In Palestine Arabs and Zionists have vied in pledges of loyalty and in offers of services to Britain. In response to appeals of Zionist organizations, planned before the outbreak of hostilities,⁹¹ 136,000 Jews were registered in various forms of war services, although it would appear that under the terms of Article 17 of the mandate none can be sent overseas for military service.⁹² Arab-Zionist hostilities have shown a marked decline. Attempts at rapprochement with the Arabs through a "Jewish-Arab Understanding League" have been initiated by the Zionists.⁹³ Closer cooperation between Arab and Jewish citrus-growers has been forced by their common problem—the disposal of a crop of 14,500,000 cases of oranges in a market capable of absorbing about 7,000,000 cases.

Apparent suspension of the application of Britain's policy for Palestine as laid down in the British White Paper of May 17, 1939⁹⁴ was welcomed by

88. Cf. *Oriente Moderno*, October 1939, pp. 540-41; November 1939, p. 589.

89. Cf. *L'Asie Française*, September-October 1939; *Oriente Moderno*, January 1940. So different were many of these statements from their past views that some observers suspect British and French pressure was used to obtain them. Cf. H. I. Katibah, "Islam and the War," *Living Age*, November 1939.

90. Cf. official communiqués, cited by *Oriente Moderno*, November 1939, p. 598; January 1940, p. 22.

91. *Palestine Post*, August 21, 1939.

92. Volunteers, however, have been accepted for an Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps, to be sent to France. *Palestine Post*, December 11, 1939. For German objections that Britain and France had violated the terms of their mandates by recruiting troops in these territories, cf. *The New York Times*, December 30, 1939.

93. *Palestine Post*, October 9, 12, 20, 1939.

94. In the White Paper His Britannic Majesty's Government declared "unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State"; that their objective was "the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State . . . in which Arabs and Jews should share in the government." The mandate was to be terminated. It provided for a transition period of five years, at the end of which a body would be set up "to review the workings of the constitutional arrangements" and "to consider and make recommendations regarding the Constitution of the independent Palestine State." Immigration was to be restricted to 10,000 per year for five years with additional 25,000 refugees at the discretion of the High Commissioner. After that period no further Jewish immigration would be "permitted unless the

the Zionists, while the Arabs made their support for Britain contingent on its modification and application.⁹⁵ The announcement, however, of February 28, 1940, restricting, in accordance with the White Paper, the sale of land in certain areas of Palestine to Zionists, has aroused vigorous Zionist protests that, while affirming support of Britain at war, they cannot accept application of the White Paper.⁹⁶

ARAB SUPPORT OF ALLIES

Severance of diplomatic relations with Germany by Egypt on September 2 and by Iraq on September 7, 1939⁹⁷ reinforced public declarations of loyalty to these countries' treaty obligations with respect to Britain made by the Regent of Iraq, Amir Abdul Ilha, by its Prime Minister, Nuri as-Said, and by the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ali Maher Pasha.⁹⁸ These striking changes in the temper of the Arab countries are due less to sudden affection for British and French rule than to anxiety regarding the consequences of German victory. The record of Italy, Germany and, more recently, the Soviet Union, has caused the Arabs to fear that the defeat of the Allies might not merely spell non-attainment of independence but also loss of political liberties already achieved. Support of the British and French cause thus became a choice between two evils. The concentration of Allied troops in the East and the physical exhaustion of Arab Nationalists in Palestine have also served to dampen Nationalist enthusiasm.

For a number of years both Italy and Germany carried on an active campaign to win Arab support and to embarrass Britain and France, through radio and press, by encouragement of clubs, schools, hospitals, and subsidized visits to Italy and Germany. The influence of these activities would now appear to have been exaggerated, and reports of German and Italian subsidies to have been for the most part unsubstantiated both by evidence and events. Few local police actions have been taken against suspects. Arab leaders of Baghdad, Damas-

Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it." The High Commissioner was to be given "powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land." For text, cf. *The New York Times*, May 18, 1939; Cmd. 6019, cited.

95. Cf. *Contemporary Jewish Record*, January-February 1940.

96. For announcements by H.M. Government, cf. *The New York Times*, February 29, March 7, 1940. For Dr. Chaim Weizmann's declaration, cf. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 4, 1940.

97. Cf. *The Times*, September 5, 8, 1939.

98. *Ibid.*, September 8, 1938; *Le Temps*, November 4, 1939; *Oriente Moderno*, September 1939, p. 506. It was subsequently declared by Ali Maher Pasha that Egypt would have joined Britain even if there had been no treaty. *Le Temps*, October 8, 1939.

cus, Jerusalem and Cairo have all complained that Italians and Germans, while making profuse promises, had delivered no arms or funds. Nor does it appear that the Fascist or semi-Fascist groups, such as the Iron Shirts (*al-qumsan al-hadidiyyah*) of Syria,⁹⁹ the Blue Shirts and Green Shirts of Egypt,¹⁰⁰ or the Nationalist party of Antun Sa'ada¹⁰¹ of the Lebanon, received more than perfunctory support from abroad. These movements, as well as local Communist groups, although obviously modeled on organizations abroad, must be regarded as isolated immature protests against local political conditions rather than far-reaching conspiracies of an international character.

THE STRUGGLE FOR TURKEY

More difficult for the Allies has been the wooing and winning of Turkey which, under its Nationalist government, had adopted the practice of accepting attentions from all and granting favors to none—not even the Soviet Union, with which it had a long-standing friendship under the Turco-Soviet Treaty of March 16, 1921.

The German Nazis, trading on the good will of many Turks educated in the Reich and on the high reputation of German goods and technical skill, made strenuous efforts to obtain political influence in Turkey, particularly at the expense of Britain and France, and to gear the country permanently into Germany's economic program. The Reich acquired not only a predominant share of Turkish foreign trade but, in competition with Britain, secured substantial contracts to supply machinery for Turkey's industrial program, ships for the new merchant marine,¹⁰² locomotives and rolling stock for railways. The Reich also received contracts to supply submarines and arms, including the completion of contracts originally made by the Turks with the Skoda plant of Czechoslovakia.¹⁰³ German firms, moreover, undertook to build railway lines,¹⁰⁴ establish an air line,¹⁰⁵ and construct a naval base at Ismıt, and a naval yard on the Golden Horn.¹⁰⁶ German experts and teachers were

engaged by the Turkish government.¹⁰⁷ German credits to Turkey for 150,000,000 marks were arranged by Dr. Walter Funk in October 1938¹⁰⁸—ostensibly to offset British credits of £16,000,000, but more probably to bring Turkey into Germany's economic orbit through long-term obligations to furnish agricultural products and raw materials. Whatever the aim of the German credits, they have not been drawn upon by Turkey.¹⁰⁹

Meanwhile, trips to Germany for Turkish students, teachers and journalists, "gifts" to newspaper editors and political figures in Turkey, especially at the time of the death of Atatürk, and propaganda efforts¹¹⁰ failed in most cases of their purpose. The Turks were displeased by the attitude of superiority assumed by many of the German experts. They were quick to protest against the inference made by German diplomatic officials that economic relations should pave the way for political favors. The failure of the Krupp firm to secure the contract for the Karabük steel plant was a setback to German influence. Early admiration for Hitler's power and his success in rebuilding Germany gave way to concern over his threats to peace. German influence in Turkey was further undermined by the *Anschluss*, the Munich accord, the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, and Germany's invasion of Poland.

In common with Britain and France, Turkey has sought maintenance of peace and the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. "Peace at home and peace abroad," early announced by Atatürk as his objective,¹¹¹ was genuinely necessary for the reconstruction of the country. Turkey's system of pacts, negotiated by Dr. Rüştü Aras, Foreign Minister from 1925 to 1938, and its membership in the League of Nations, the Balkan Entente and the Middle East Bloc would seem to indicate its desire for peace, in spite of the bellicose mood it displayed in 1937 and 1938 over Alexandretta. At the present time Turkey's hard-won independence does not appear menaced by France and Britain. By contrast, Nazi Germany and its axis partner, Italy—long considered Turkey's principal enemy because of Mussolini's frequent references to Italian

99. For an account of its organization and program, cf. *Oriente Moderno*, May 1936, pp. 264-65.

100. Now "Young Egyptians." Cf. *The Times*, January 1, 1936; *Oriente Moderno*, Anno XIV, XV, XVI, *passim*. For program, cf. *ibid.*, September 1938, pp. 491-94.

101. For origin and program, cf. *The Times*, November 23, 1935; *Oriente Moderno*, December 1935, pp. 633-34, January 1936, pp. 11-12.

102. *Cumhuriyet*, February 17, 18, 1937.

103. *Ibid.*, July 24, 1938.

104. August von Kral, *Kamāl Atatürk's Land* (London, P. S. Smith, 1938), p. 148.

105. *The New York Times*, April 20, 1939.

106. *Ibid.*, April 21, 1939.

107. *Cumhuriyet*, July 24, 1938. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1936, cited, p. 183; von Kral, *Kamāl Atatürk's Land*, cited, p. 153. A number of German experts were dismissed by Turkey on February 9, 1940.

108. *Ankara*, October 13, 1938; *The Economist*, October 15, 1938.

109. *Special Report No. 63*, U. S. Commercial Attaché, Istanbul, October 7, 1939.

110. Cf. Nermin Muvaḫḫak, "Turkey Is Not Neutral," *The Nation*, February 17, 1940.

111. *Histoire de la République Turque* (Istanbul, Devlet Basımevi, 1935), p. 199.

destiny in Asia¹¹² and Italy's fortified bases in the Dodecanese off the Anatolian coast—are regarded by the Turks as threats to the *status quo*. Through credit and clearing agreements Britain and France offered relief from Germany's economic domination and opened prospects of financial assistance for armament and industrialization programs and currency revaluation which Germany could not furnish. Should Turkey reverse its non-expansionist policy and demand territorial compensation for its war efforts,¹¹³ Britain and France are now in a position to grant more than Germany.¹¹⁴

Few observers were surprised, therefore, when the Anglo-French agreements with Turkey were signed on May 12 and June 23,¹¹⁵ and transformed into the Tri-Partite Mutual Assistance Pact on October 19, 1939, following the breakdown of the Soviet-Turkish conversations in Moscow during the first weeks of October—particularly since the pact foreshadowed large-scale financial assistance by the Allies to Turkey. This assistance, stipulated before the pact was even signed, was set forth in an additional agreement with Britain and France on January 8, 1940,¹¹⁶ and a trade agreement with Britain on February 3, 1940.¹¹⁷ The former provides for loans of £25,000,000 and 264,750,000 francs respectively, of which £25,000,000 is to be applied to the purchase of armaments in France and Britain. The balance is to be used in liquidating accumulated debts to Britain and France, while an additional £2,000,000 has been set aside to cover overdue payments to British exporters. In addition, £15,000,000 in gold, reported to have arrived in Turkey, was granted for the support of Turkish currency.¹¹⁸ These sums, together with the £16,000,000 provided by the May 27, 1939 agreement, the £3,000,000 credits for the construction of

Karabük, and £9,000,000 credits reported granted in June 1939,¹¹⁹ total about \$352,000,000—no small subsidy for a country whose annual budget is little more than half this sum.

THE COMING CONFLICT

The ultimate purposes of these various preparations—strengthening of the air and naval bases in the Near East, Allied pacts and agreements with Turkey, heavy concentration of troops, and numerous joint staff conversations in Turkey and Egypt—cannot be forecast with any degree of assurance. Only the issues at stake and possible military objectives can be suggested.

Military measures in the Near East, which have received considerable publicity, might be dismissed as forms of insurance principally designed to restrain Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union, and to stiffen the resistance of the Balkan states.¹²⁰ More positive action, however, appears to be contemplated: either to meet offensives by Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union, singly or in combination, or to enable the Allies to take the offensive themselves. Any offensive by either side seems most likely in the Black Sea area, either at the Balkan or at the Asiatic end, or else in the direction of the oil fields of northern Iraq and southern Iran. Thus the areas of conflict are roughly those of the oil regions of the Near and Middle East.

At the moment, the Balkan end of the Black Sea is the point of greatest tension. The Balkan states and the U.S.S.R. now represent the principal gaps in the economic blockade of Germany.¹²¹ These gaps the Germans are determined to keep open, while the Allies are equally determined to close them either by purchasing all surplus supplies or by applying political pressure, as in Yugoslavia over bauxite and Rumania over oil.¹²²

STRUGGLE FOR RUMANIAN OIL

In Rumania both sides appear prepared to go further than political and economic pressure. Bri-

112. In particular, Mussolini's declaration of March 18, 1934. For Turkish opinion, cf. *Vakit*, March 25, 1934; *Milliet*, April 15, 1934.

113. Cf. Harold Laycock, *Christian Science Monitor Magazine*, July 22, 1939. Although the Tri-Partite Agreement was welcomed by many elements in Palestine, Egypt and Iraq as contributing to peace in the Near East, a large section of Arabic opinion has expressed the fear that it may have assigned to Turkey the rôle of wartime guardian over Arab countries, with possible territorial concessions at their expense as compensation. Cf. *Filastin*, October 25, 1939; *Oriente Moderno*, November 1939; P. Rondot, "La Turquie et les Problèmes Méditerranéens," *Politique Etrangère*, October 1939.

114. Britain also gained influence through its support of Turkey at the Montreux Conference of 1936 for revision of the 1923 Straits Convention, and of Turkish demands for cession by France of the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Cf. *Tan*, July 22, 1936.

115. *The New York Times*, May 13, 1939; *The Times*, June 24, 1939; *Tan*, June 24, 1939.

116. *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1940.

117. *Ibid.*, February 3, 1940.

118. *Ibid.*, January 29, 1940.

119. *Ibid.*, January 17, 1940.

120. The mounting strength of the Allies has been successful, according to the Turkish Foreign Minister, in decreasing the risk of war in the Balkans. *The New York Times*, February 14, 1940.

121. Cf. Bruce C. Hopper, "How Much Can and Will Russia Aid Germany?" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1940; deWilde, "The Struggle for the Balkans," cited.

122. Germany demands fulfillment of the agreement of December 1939, by which Rumania undertook to furnish 45 per cent of its oil exports, or over a million barrels a month. These exports are opposed by Britain and France on the ground that British and French companies which control about 57 per cent of Rumania's oil production should not be obliged to furnish oil to Germany.

tain, in its representations to Rumania, has left no doubt of its intentions to take drastic measures if oil continues to be supplied to Germany.¹²³ It seems no mere coincidence that pressure on Rumania was increased as New Zealand and Australian reinforcements neared Egypt.

The Germans, on their side, have intimated that Rumanian oil "is a matter of life and death," and that the Reich must have it in increased quantities or it will "be compelled to seek it by other methods."¹²⁴ The clash in Rumania is thus more than a question of oil, vital as this is. It may reveal whether Germany can continue to obtain supplies from the Balkans without asserting its political control, which might involve it in war in that area. It may also reveal whether Germany will be forced to fight on more than one front—a development the German High Command apparently desires to avoid but which Britain and France, with their preparations in the East, their command of the seas, and their concept of war on many fronts, would apparently welcome. Moreover, aggressive action by Germany would test the Allies' pledge of assistance to Rumania of April 13, 1939.¹²⁵ An attempt by the Allies to implement this pledge would, in turn, indicate the extent of Turkey's allegiance to the Tri-Partite Agreement. Turkish officials have long refused to commit themselves, but recent statements and events seem to indicate that Turkey will stand by the pact notwithstanding its right, under Protocol II, to avoid the risk of war with the Soviet Union.¹²⁶ The Turkish Foreign Minister, Şükrü Saracoglu, has admitted that Turkey "is not neutral but merely out of the war."¹²⁷ And even further, that "if an aggressive move obliges other powers to aid the victim under the pact registered at Geneva to which we are a party, the Montreux Convention goes immediately into effect."¹²⁸ This would necessitate the opening of the Straits to the fleets of Britain and France, to facilitate Allied aid to Rumania.

STRUGGLE FOR SOVIET OIL

Another threat to peace in the Near East comes from the direction of the Soviet Union.¹²⁹ If Soviet

policy since August 24, 1939 of obtaining strategic centers for the better protection of its own frontiers and prevention of armed intervention is extended to the south, it is possible that the U.S.S.R. may attempt (1) to recover Bessarabia in order to protect the Ukraine and the Odessa-Lwow railroad,¹³⁰ (2) to obtain control of the Black Sea and the Straits, and acquire Istanbul as a warm-water port; and (3) to create a barrier in addition to the fortifications already built in Russia's Caucasian oil regions.

A Soviet attack on Bessarabia would force Turkey to choose between adhering to Soviet-Turkish friendship or breaking with the Soviet Union. The growing conviction of the Turkish government that the U.S.S.R. is resuming the imperialist ambitions of the Tsars with respect to Istanbul and the Straits is based on several factors. These include Soviet demands in the Moscow conversations of October 1939 that Turkey close the Dardanelles to foreign warships and undertake obligations toward the Balkans incompatible with its existing treaties.¹³¹ Turkish suspicions were increased by the rumor that Moscow had asked Bulgaria for a port on the Black Sea as compensation for aiding Bulgaria's recovery of the Dobrudja, lost to Rumania in 1913; the threats voiced by Soviet newspapers;¹³² and the reported movement of Soviet troops into the Caucasus near the Turkish border.¹³³

A Russian move into the Caucasus might be inspired by the desire to recover Turkey's eastern provinces, originally conquered by Russia in 1878 but returned to Turkey by the Treaty of Kars of October 13, 1921.¹³⁴ It is more probable, however, that Moscow's object is to provide a protective belt for the Caucasus against outside attack. For in the Caucasus lie the oil fields of Baku, producing 75 per cent of Russia's oil, and Grozny, Russia's second largest producing field. Linking Baku with Batum are two pipe lines and a railroad with a terminal also at Poti. Grozny is connected by a pipe line to Tuapse on the Black Sea and one northward to Rostov. In addition, a railroad connects Baku and Kiev by way of Rostov.¹³⁵

123. *Le Temps*, according to *The New York Times* of January 26, 1940, stated outright that Britain and France would do everything in their power, even against Rumania's will, to prevent German control of Rumania's markets.

124. *The New York Times*, January 26, 1940.

125. *Ibid.*, April 14, 1939.

126. For text, cf. *ibid.*, October 20, 1939.

127. *Ibid.*, February 2, 1940.

128. *Ibid.*, February 14, 1940.

129. Cf. V. M. Dean, "Russia's Role in the European Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports*, March 1, 1940.

130. *Ibid.*, February 12, 13, 1940.

131. Turkish communiqué, October 17, 1939. *The New York Times*, October 18, 1939.

132. Cited by *ibid.*, November 16, 1939, February 10, 1940.

133. Turkish officials and press, however, have continued to maintain a friendly attitude toward Russia. Cf. statement by the Turkish Prime Minister, Refik Saydam, *The New York Times*, March 1, 1940; also *ibid.*, February 25, 1940; *Yeni Sabah*, February 26, 1940; Muvaffak, "Turkey Is Not Neutral," cited.

134. For text, cf. *Current History*, February 1923.

135. Cf. excellent map in *The Economist*, January 13, 1940.

Baku lies but 125 miles from the Turkish border and 325 miles from Teheran, short distances for air bombers. Batum is but 15 miles from the Turkish frontier, Poti about 55 miles. The Baku-Batum pipe lines and railways are not more than 100 miles at any point from the Turkish frontier, but over rough mountainous terrain, while another railway from Tiflis to Baku parallels the Turkish and Iranian borders for several hundred miles. Moscow's attitude toward both Turkey and Iran is conditioned by these facts, as well as by the memory that Turkey occupied the Caucasus after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 3, 1918; that Britain, Turkey's present ally, entered that region in late 1918; that British forces reached Baku from Persia in 1918; and that Turkey again reoccupied it in 1920.

Germany is particularly concerned regarding the fate of the oil regions of the U.S.S.R., whose output could be of the utmost importance to the German war machine.¹³⁶ Should oil and other supplies available to the Reich in the Balkans and the Caucasus be endangered by the Allies, Germany might be forced to cooperate with the Soviet Union in taking the offensive against France and Britain.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

A Soviet expedition into Iran, extending only to the low-lying regions around the Caspian and to Tabriz, is not so improbable as it appears at first sight. Iran in these districts offers the prospect of less resistance to Russia than the Western end of the Black Sea. Success there would enable Russian troops to attack the Turkish flank. Less likely is a Soviet advance to the Iraq and Iran oil fields, the Persian Gulf, and India because of the difficulties of the terrain and of maintaining a long line of communications. Extensive damage to oil installations in Iraq and Iran might, however, be inflicted by air. Iran has no Man-nerheim Line, only its formidable barriers of mountains as a defense against invasion. These mountains, the forces of Reza Shah, numbering approximately 100,000 and equipped with about 200 airplanes, 100 new Skoda tanks and other modern weapons, might hold for a time against Russia. More effective would be guerrilla warfare by Iran's troops against Russian lines of communications. Should Iran be threatened by invasion, moreover, it might obtain the assistance of Turkey, Iraq and

Afghanistan, all signatories with Iran of the Pact of Sa'adebad of July 8, 1937.¹³⁷ This pact is merely a regional non-aggression agreement, but its terms call for consultation in case of aggression or threat of aggression. The solidarity of the Middle East Bloc has never been tested but, in view of the common danger and of possible support from British troops and supplies, the three other members of the Sa'adebad Pact might come to Iran's aid, using the Baghdad-Kazvin, the Ruwanduz Gorge-Tabriz and the Trabzon-Tabriz roads described above.

Any invasion of Iran, regardless of its objectives, would be of concern to Britain, which is interested in the safety of its ally Iraq, with its oil wells at Kirkuk and Khaniqin, in the wells and refineries of southern Iran, and in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf and on the Indian frontier.¹³⁸ Iraq is a wedge of British influence extending into the Middle East by which Britain can, if need be, strike at the flank of forces invading Iran or Afghanistan. Friendship with Iran and support of the Sa'adebad signatories appear to be Britain's present policy rather than any concentration of British troops in Iraq.

An offensive on the part of Britain and France in Rumania or in the Caucasus or both cannot be ruled out should deadlock persist on the western front. An Allied offensive in the Near East would still seek, as its principal aim, to tighten the blockade against Germany, either by excluding the Reich from Balkan supplies, beginning with Rumanian oil, or by increasing the difficulties of Soviet-German cooperation.¹³⁹

Whether launching an offensive on the U.S.S.R. or meeting a Soviet offensive, the Allies would undoubtedly attempt to control the Black Sea. By the capture of Odessa and possibly Rostov they might interrupt rail transport of Russian oil, Iranian cotton and other supplies to Germany.¹⁴⁰ They might also prevent any possible assembling of German

137. For text, cf. *Oriente Moderno*, July 1937, pp. 369-70. Cf. also Abbas Khalatbary, *L'Iran et le Pacte Oriental* (Paris, Pedone, 1938).

138. Russian forces penetrated Central Persia during the war of 1914-1918, and a small group of Russian officers reached Baghdad. It is unlikely that the Russians can count on making use of Kurdish nationalism to assist them in the present conflict.

139. In any move in the Near and Middle East, the Allies are dependent on continued control of the Mediterranean Sea routes. For the part which Italy may play in Allied plans in the Near East, cf. R. G. Woolbert, "Italy's Rôle in the European Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 1, 1940.

140. Germany has apparently increased its efforts to revive trade with Iran and the Caucasus by way of the Black Sea and of Russian railways. It is reported that 2,000 bales of Iranian cotton await shipment to Germany in Iran's Caspian ports. Cf. *Great Britain and the East*, February 1, 1940.

136. Soviet oil for Germany by the Black Sea is reported to have first reached Constanza in Rumania on February 17, 1940. *Christian Science Monitor*, February 19, 1940.

submarines in Soviet ports. It seems equally certain—as the Russians fear—that the Allies would attempt to seize Soviet sources of oil and other supplies for the Reich.

The prospect of an offensive against Russia might prove welcome to Turkey. It would relieve Turkey's anxiety for Istanbul and its eastern provinces. It might also make it possible for Turkey, in spite of its proclaimed policy of being a "satisfied" power, to regain territory lost in previous wars with Russia. Above all, if the Allies could be persuaded, in the event of a successful war, to permit the Turks to take possession of the Baku and even the Grozny oil fields, Turkey's most pressing economic problem would be solved. Such a development might appeal to the Allies, since it would divert Turkey from possible expansion in the direction of the oil fields of northern Syria and Iraq.

Soviet invasion of India by way of Iran or Afghanistan seems remote. The physical obstacles are great. The motor route from the Termez railhead over the Hindu-Kush to Kabul is open only a few months of the year. The route from the Kushk Post railhead over the Ardawan pass to Herat and on to Chaman, the Indian railhead, has long, waterless stretches and is not well constructed. Even less adapted to wheeled vehicles is the road from Kandahar to Kabul. Germany would undoubtedly seek to prevent a Russian expedition which would burden Soviet transport facilities without great hope of material rewards unless Afghanistan should join Russia, of which there is no immediate prospect. A Soviet air attack could be made on Afghanistan and the Indian frontier but only with considerable difficulty and, unless accompanied by troop movements, could have little permanent effect. Should invasion occur, Indian frontier forces, reinforced by existing British air squadrons, should be able to hold off Soviet troops until assistance arrived from overseas.

The possibility of disturbance of internal peace in Arab sections of the Near East must also be taken into consideration. Arab nationalism is not dead. Palestine Defence Committees have not been disbanded. Arab leaders have not disappeared, but

have only been rendered inarticulate by censorship and by fear of greater dangers from Europe. Zionists in Palestine and abroad, for their part, are concerned regarding the fate of the country on which they have expended so much effort and money.

No enemy now exists—as in the last war—against which an Arab revolt could be directed by Britain, unless the Russians should descend from Kurdistan into the plains of Iraq. It seems more probable that an Arab revolt, if it occurs, will as in 1916-1918 be directed against the occupiers of Arab lands, whoever they may be. Such a revolt depends on the recuperation of Arab nationalists in Palestine, exhausted by the conflicts of recent years, and on clear evidence that Britain or France intend to nullify the promises made by them in the White Paper and in various treaties. It will depend, above all, on the success of Allied arms elsewhere. Only if the dangers of German, Italian and Soviet expansion are removed, are the Arabs likely to disturb the peace of the Near East.

In the struggle for control of the Near East, Britain and France have clearly won the first round without serious opposition from the totalitarian powers. The Allies now hold the strategic points, the principal lines of communications and the economic resources of the Near East to the disadvantage of Germany, Russia and Italy. The Allies have won the sympathy and support of the Near East peoples, including the Arab Nationalists, who are still torn between desire for self-government and mortal fear of losing all they have already attained. Cessation of Russo-Finnish hostilities on March 13 may turn the attention of the U.S.S.R. with or without German assistance, to the Balkans and the Near East. The Allies can use their steadily increasing military forces in the Near East to meet this and other threats and to attain their objectives, which include the economic blockade of Germany, the prevention of Russo-German cooperation and the protection of Allied resources, principally oil. It may require only an incident—which spring or early summer may bring—to involve the Near East more deeply in the European conflict.

The April 1 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS will be

THE WAR AND AMERICAN SHIPPING

by John C. deWilde